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COURTS-MARTIAL JURISDICTION AND CIVILIAN
DEPENDENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS
I N two recent cases, Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger ' thd
United States Supreme Court has had occasion to re-examine the nature
and scope of the constitutional guarantees2 extended to American citizens
in criminal cases arising outside the United Statess and its incorporated
territories. 4  There, speaking for a divided Court, Mr. Justice Black,
'Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
... The judges ...shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall,
at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which-shall not be di-
minished during their continuance in office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § x. "The judicial
power shall extend to all cases ... arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties made . . . under their authority. . . . The trial of all
crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held
in the state where the said crimes have been committed; but when not committed
within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the congress may by law
have directed." U.S. CONS'r. art. III, § 2.
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public
danger... 2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed. . . " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
' In cases arising outside the United States a citizen's right to indictment and a jury
trial has historically been limited. Exemplary is In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464
(ggi), wherein the Court stated, "The Constitution can have no operation in another
country. When, therefore, the representatives or officers of our government are per-
mitted to exercise authority of any kind in another country, it must be on such condi-
tions as the two countries may agree, the laws of neither one being obligatory upon
the other."
'Traditionally, territorial courts have been bound by all the provisions and limita-
tions of the constitution. See Thompson v. Utah, xo U.S. 343 (1898). However,
during the period following the Spanish-American War it was held that every pro-
vision of the constitution did not extend to recently conquered territory until it had
been technically incorporated into the United States. The first cases so holding were
Downes v. Bidwell, 1S2 U.S. 244 (19ox) and Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. x97
(1903), the rationale being that a short period of time was necessary immediately fol-
lowing acquisition to give officials an opportunity to established an orderly civil ad-
ministration. In these two cases Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Brewer, Mr. Justice
Peckham, and Mr. Chief Justice Fuller dissented, holding that if part of the constitu-
tion applied to a person or to property, then the whole" constitution had to be
considered as applicable. The Dowres and Mankichi rule was later extended to hold
that jury trial was not applictble to an American citizen in Puerto Rico in 1922, some
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who was joined by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice. Douglas, and Mr.
Justice Brennan, held that civilian dependents accompanying military
personnel overseas could not, in time of peace, be tried for capital
offenses by courts-martial under article 2 (ii) of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice,5 nor could Congress constitutionally so provide. Con-
gressional authority to enact military law and to provide for its enforce-
ment," it was asserted, extends only "to persons who are members of
the armed services," and the power to deny grand jury indictment and
trial by petit jury before an impartial judge to military personnel is not
enlarged by the "necessary and proper" clause to include civilian de-
pendents 7 Although it was conceded that some persons might be
considered "in" the armed services for court-martial purposes even if
they had not technically been enlisted or inducted," it was held to be
twenty-four years after the conquest. Balzac v. People of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
(1922).
' "Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United States
is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, all persons serving
with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits
of the United States and without the following territories: That part of Alaska east
of longitude- one hundred and seventy-two degrees west, the Canal Zone, the main
group of Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands." 64 STAT. 109 (1950),
50 U.S.C. § 552(11) (1952.).
"The Congress shall have power to . . . make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces . .. to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, . . 21 U.S.
Co.sT. art. I, § 8. Under its power to make rules for the government and regulation
of the land and naval forces, Congress may provide for the trial and punishment of
military and naval offenses in the manner practiced by civilized nations. This authority
is apparently independent of the judicial power conferred by article three. Dynes v.
Hoover, 61 U.S. (zo How.) 65 (1858).
'The scope of the "necessary and proper" clause was established in McCulloch v.
Matryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (i859) wherein Chief Justice Marshall stated,
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
In the instant cases article three as well as the fifth and sixth amendments concerning
indictment, judges, and petit juries limit the government's power to provide any other
type of trial for civilians, and because of them the necessary and proper clause cannot
operate to extend military jurisdiction to any group of persons beyond that class
described in article one, section eight, clause fourteen, as constituting "the land and
naval forces."
'The test of military jurisdiction over service personnel seems to be whether the
accused took the oath of allegiance customarily administered during induction. "How-
ever, under the Code, as under prior law, failure to take the oath will not keep
military jurisdiction from attaching if the draftee goes ahead with life as a soldier
without calling attention to the omitted formality." EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE 18
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clear that the wives, children and other dependents of servicemen can-
not be placed in that category.9
Mr. Justice Frankfurter 0 and Mr. Justice Harlan" concurred in
the result but, relying on the narrow distinction drawn in Powell v.
Alabaman 2 between capital and noncapital crimes, explicitly reserved
judgment as to whether Congress could constitutionally provide for
the court-martial of civilian dependents on noncapital charges.
In dissent,' 3 Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Burton concluded
that article 2 (1-1) of the Uniform Code was a necessary and proper
exercise of the power granted to Congress to govern and regulate the
(1956). The court in the instant cases stated that the lower federal courts have upheld
military trial of civilians performing services for the armed forces "in the field" during
the time of war, and these decisions rest on the government's "war powers."
'The status of certain other civilians stationed with the military is apparently still
to be resolved. Employees of the various branches of the service, technical repre-
sentatives, school teachers, as well as dependents and all others charged with non-
capital crimes, will have to seek a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court
to test the validity of court-martial jurisdiction over their person. In the Toth, Covert,
and Kreuger cases the Court outlined its broad objections to trial of civilians by courts-
martial: (i) absence of judicial tenure, (2) absence of protection for the judge's salary,
(3) possible presence of executive department influence, (4) difference in trial by
civilian jury and members of the military forces, (5) emphasis of summary procedures,
(6) harshness of courts-martial penalties, (7) possible derogation of individual rights,
(8) presence of command influence, (9) absence of indictment-by a grand jury, (io)
vagueness of military law, (xi) presence of possible Presidential change in procedural
and substantive laws, and (x7) presence of possible encroachment upon the doctrine of
separation of powers.
10 354 U.S. at 4x. 12 354 U.S. at 65.
22 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Covert, stated that "the taking
of life is irrevocable. It is in capital cases, especially, that the balance of conflicting in-
terests must be weighed most heavily in favor of the procedural safeguards of the
Bill of Rights. Thus, in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932), the fact above
all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives led the court to conclude that the
defendants had been denied due process by the failure to allow them reasonable time to
seek counsel and the failure to appoint counsel.... I repeat. I do not mean to imply
that the considerations that are controlling in capital cases involving civilian dependents
are constitutionally irrelevant in capital cases involving civilians other than dependents
or in noncapital cases involving' dependents or other civilians. I do say that we are
dealing here only with capital cases and civilian dependents." 354 U.S. at 45-46. Mr.
Justice Harlan, concurring, states that, "so far as capital cases are concerned, I think they
stand on quite a different footing than other offenses. In such cases the law is especially
sensitive to demands for that procedural fairness which inheres in a civilian trial where
the judge and trier of fact are not responsive to the command of the convening authority.
I do not concede that whatever process is 'due' an offender faced with fine or prison
sentence necessarily satisfies the requirements of the constitution in a capital case.
The distinction is by no means novel." 354 U.S. at 77-
is 354 U.S. at 78.
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land and naval forces, even when applied to certain civilians. Further-
more, they reasoned that Congress could provide for the trial of citizens
in foreign countries, without regard to article three and the fifth and
sixth amendments of the Constitution, so long as the procedure estab-
lished was reasonable and otherwise consonant with due process require-
ments, apparently recognizing no constitutional distinction between cap-
ital and noncapital' 4 offenses.
The difficulty inherent in any attempt to demarcate a boundary be-
tween a "civilian" and a member of the "land and naval forces" is
readily apparent, since each of the numerous classes of "military civil-
ians" embodies its own peculiarity of definition. It would appear, there-
fore, that each individual case must be judged on the basis of its own
particular facts, a perhaps unfortunate result in that it affords, at best,
a tedious method by which military commanders may obtain authorita-
tive guidance in the disposition of borderline cases. 1r Concomitantly,
the immediate disciplinary needs of the services and their relations with
foreign governments may be prejudiced, and overseas commanders
who are charged with the deterrence of black marketeering, narcotics
traffic, breach of security regulations, and other crimes may be denied
adequate means of control over civilian personnel. 1
"
4Taken as a whole, the three opinions in the instant cases appear to stand only
for the limited proposition that military tribunals may not try dependents accompanying
military personnel for capital offenses overseas. See Brief for the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy as Amicus Curiae, p. 4, United States v. Bruce Wilson, Docket No.
9638, Court of Miliatry Appeals. Whether the court will so hold, however, remains
to be seen and presents a conundrum which, perhaps, will be determined by the final
ruling' in the Wilson case. In the interim, some military authorities have taken the
position that the i'stant opinions must be limited to the majority view and have,
accordingly, instructed overseas commanders to the effect that court-martial policy
remains unchanged, with the exception that no dependent will be tried for a capital
offense. Letter from the Judge Advocate General of the Army to DUKE LAW JOURNAL.,
Dec. 4, x957, on file in Duke University Law Library.
"5 The Court of Military Appeals is now faced with the problem of determining
the proper disposition of certain 'ases of this type. In United States v. Bruce Wilson,
Docket No. 9638, Court of Military Appeals, defendant, a civilian employee, was
found guilty by a general court-martial sitting in Berlin, Germany of violations of
Articles z5 and 134. of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and was sentenced
to be confined at hard labor for ten years. In United States v. Theodore S. Dyer,
Docket No. zo,o61, Court of Military Appeals, defendant, a civilian employed by the
Air Force in Japan, was found guilty by a general court-martial of violations of Article
121 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and was sentenced to pay a fine of four
hundred and sixty dollars and to be confined at hard labor for one year, the officer
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction approving only so much of the sentence
as provided for confinement at hard labor for one year.
" "In order to grasp the magnitude of the problem which faces the armed forces
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If, however, as four justices imply, article 2 (ii) is to be deemed
constitutionally inapplicable to all "military-civilians," by what tribunal
shall they be tried? Existing status-of-forces agreements expressly pre-
dude the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in the receiving state by other
than the "military authorities" of the sending state.17 As defined, "mili-
tary authorities" are "those authorities of the sending state who are
empowered by its law to enforce the military law of that state. .
This definition would appear sufficiently broad to include any civilian
courts which might be created or empowered by Congress to fill the
overseas, it is necessary to understand that civilians accompanying the armed forces in
foreign countries involve rather large numbers. As of 3 December 1956 there were
a total of 1,186,445 United States citizens working for or accompanying the Depart-
ment of Defense in foreign countries, excluding territories and possessions. Of this
total, 731,623 were military personnel and 454,822 were civilians. Of the total
number of civilians 37,971 comprised such civilian components as departmental em-
ployees, technical representatives, contractor employees, USO employees, American
Red Cross and so forth, and 416,85 were dependents; In brief, there are over a
million people overseas of whom almost half a million are civilians, and the greatest
portion of these civilians are dependents. It can be seen then that from the standpoint
of the number of people involved alone, this is no small problem." Letter from the
Judge Advocate General of the Air Force to DUKE LAW JOURNAL, Oct. 30, 1957, on file
in Duke University Law Library.
" ,... . it should be noted that all cases involving offenses committed by members
of the civilian component and dependents may be entertained by local courts im-
mediately upon loss of court-martial jurisdiction over those persons, and without action
of any kind on the part of the United States, with the following exceptions:
a. In the Federal Republic of Germany, offenses under the Bonn Conventions,
offenses under German law committed by dependents or civilian employees against
other than German interests may be transferred to the German courts with the consent
of the German authorities.
b. In the Philippines, offenses committed on military bases by dependents or, civilian
employees will be subject to Philippine jurisdiction upon mere notification to the
Philippine prosecutor of the intention of the United States not to prosecute.,
c. In the leased Territories (Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Guiana, Jamaica,
Santa Lucia, Trinidad, and the Turks and Caicos Islands), the United States enjoys
concurrent jurisdiction only with respect to offenses committed within United States
Military sites. The agreements provide that in the event the United States decides not
to prosecute a given case, the local courts may do so, provided both governments agree
that the offender should be tried."...
Thus, it would appear that "in the absence of legislation and of international agree-
ments . . . the courts of the receiving States would have the exclusive right to exercise
criminal jurisdiction, in all cases cognizable under local law, over all civilian personnel
(civilian employees and dependents) to whom court-martial jurisdiction does not
extend." Study prepared by the Committee of Military, Naval and Air Law of the
Section of International and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association, entitled
Trial of Civilian Personnel by Foreign Courts, pp. 1-2.
24 U.S. TREATiEs AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 1794 (1953).
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vacuum produced by the instant decisions.19 But there are several
practical objections to this approach. Paramount among these is the
fact that the use of extraterritoral courts has been deemed an affront to
national pride,20 and it is generally conceded that most foreign govern-
ments would not permit it.21 Moreover, such a system would necessi-
tate, inter alia, the use of grand juries, petit juries, and compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses and jurors i and a jury composed of
military personnel and their dependents would be susceptible to attack
as being subject to command influence, thus failing to meet the objection
of the Court.2
Other possible solutions include the establishment of additonal
article three courts or a separate judicial system directly connected with
individual military commands. 23 The former, while apparently con-
stitutionally possible, however, would encounter the same practical im-
pediments as the extraterritorial civil courts. And the instant decisions
would seem to prohibit the later if created pursuant to article one,
rather than article three, of the Constitution.
But regardless of the form of the court employed, it is still possible
"See 46 GEo. L.J. 367 (1957).
" It is one thing for a nation to allow court-martial to try an occasional civilian
when the vast majority of the cases involve military personnel, but quite another to
permit a formal United States court to sit within its territory for the sole purpose of
trying civilian cases. The full panoply of American justice, including grand juries,
United States attorneys, and jury trials, might be more than a country with even a
modicum of national pride would be willing to accept. . . . But it must be re-
membered that the foreign sovereign usually has primary jurisdiction over dependents,
and jurisdiction can be exercised over these people only with its consent in each
case. Furthermore, insistence on this interpretation could jeopardize the status-of-forces
agreements, as well as our foreign relations generally (Article XVI of the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement provides that differences as to interpretation of the agree-
ment are to be 'settled by negotiation ...without recourse to any outside jurisdiction.'
Differences which cannot be settled by direct negotiation are to be referred to the North
Atlantic Council. Article XIX provides that the status-of-forces agreement can now
be 'denounced' at will by any of the contracting parties.)" 71 HARV. L. REV. 724,
725 (.958).
"
1 See note x 8 supra. 2354 U.S. at 87.
I2 Additional solutions might include: (i) trial of all dependents in foreign courts
just as all tourists are subject to foreign court jurisdiction; (2) trial of dependents by
federal district courts in the United States; (3) trial of dependents by federal district
courts in foreign countries; (4) establishment of legislative courts under article one in
foreign countries; (5) allowance of all dependents to choose, via waiver of jury trial
guarantees, between a foreign trial and a trial by courts-martial; (6) declaration of all
offenses committed by dependents to be noncapital; (7) bringing of all troops overseas
home or disallowance of dependents to travel with them. See 71 HARv. L. Ray. 712
(5958); 2 WAYNE L. RaV. 205 (1956).
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that military authorities, relying on the narrowest interpretation of the
Krueger and Covert cases, can assume jurisdiction over civilians abroad
by declaring a particular offense noncapital.24  Such an approach would
give a decided advantage to civilians with respect to offenses that would
be capital if committed by servicemen. The significance of this dis-
tinction fades, however, when one considers the alternative of no juris-
diction at all over civilians. The Department of Defense, therefore,
has resolved, for the present, to rely upon this narrow interpretation2
It has also been suggested that since citizens can waive their right
to indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury,26 they can, thus,
elect whether to be tried by foreign courts or by courts-martial. 7 The
absence of indictment and jury trial are not the only objections to trial
of civilians by courts-martial, however; command influence, it is widely
felt, and absence of life tenure for judges derogate from- judicial
independence.28  Furthermore, if the foreign country refused to assume
jurisdiction the civilian, under the proposed option, might conceivably
escape trial. This possibility is minimized,. of course, by the fact that
absent jurisdiction of American courts,2 civilian employees and depend-
ents, will, under existing agreements, be subject to foreign criminal juris-
diction in all cases cognizable under foreign law.80 Indeed, the NATO
"The distinction drawn between capital and noncapital offenses, which is presently
being relied upon by the various branches of the services, is of doubtful validity since
four Justices speaking for the Court foreclosed this distinction and the two dissenting
Justices agreed that there was no valid constitutional distinction between capital and
noncapital offenses, leaving only the two concurring Justices to give weight to this
distinction, and one of them specifically reserved comment on the problem until such
time as it was squarely presented to the Court. See 7' HARV. L. REV. 713 (1958).
"s See note 14. supra.
20 7! HARV. L. REV. 713, 721 (.958).
"'The voluntariness of any "waiver" signed by a dependent as a condition to
accompany her husband overseas, or once overseas the voluntariness of "waiver" upon
threat of foreign trial is questionable. See note 9 supra.
354 U.S. at 36.
' Until the decision in the instant cases it was probably contemplated by Congress,
although perhaps somewhat erroneously, that under article 134 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice there would be few crimes indeed as to which the United States
lacked concurrent jurisdiction. ". . . all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring dis-
credit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons
subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general or
special or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense,
and punished at the discretion of such court." 64 STAT. 142 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 728
(1952).
"sNorth Atlantic Treaty, June ig, 195i, art. vii, x(b), 2(b), 3, 4 U.S.
TREATIES AND OTHER INTER1ATIONAL AGREEMENTS 18oo (1953), T.i.A.S. No. 2846.
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Status-of-Forces Agreement recognizes the possible lack of jurisdiction
of some offenses in the state of domicile, in which event it was clearly
contemplated that the host state would exercise jurisdiction."'
As matters now stand, however, unless the decision in Krueger and
Covert is limited to its narrowest construction, military authorities over-
seas will be faced in peacetime with grave problems concerning the
enforcement of purely military regulations, the violation of which may
constitute no transgression of foreign law.2  Moreover, dual forums
applying variant law for trials of offenses committed jointly by civilian
and military personnel would inevitably produce palpable inequities and
discontent.8 It thus becomes apparent that a plenary solution to the
dilemma created by Krueger and Covert must be more imaginative and
broader in scope than any of the possibilities heretofore mentioned.
The answer might lie in the creation of courts by an association of
nations to have jurisdiction over all "military-dvilians" of any member
nation located within other member countries, although this suggestion,
likewise, has many practical obstades. First, granting jurisdiction over
Americans to a supranational court would render inapplicable, at least
partially, the provisions of the Constitution," which might prove fatally
defective. The usual objection to extraterritoriality would be less ap-
plicable, however, since each sovereign would surrender the same inci-
dents of national sovereignty to the same supranational body.
Second, determination of applicable law poses a problem. A single
standard code embodying the basic concepts of justice as 'recognized
by the constitutions, customs, or statutory standards of other participating
nations could be adopted. In the alternative, the choice of law might
be made to depend on the nationality of the particular defendant, thus
preserving to him a consistent standard of justice.35
rt. a. VII, z(a), 2(a), (c).
"Examples of such problems are treason against the state, sabotage, espionage or
violation of any law relating to official secrets of that state, black-marketing, use of
military currency and the like.
"The problem would, however, be diminished or completely obviated in the event
of actual warfare, or recent conclusion thereof, through substitution of martial law and
the law of war for civil jurisdiction. EVERTr, MILITARY JUSTICE 19 (1956).
"It would seem that since a sovereign has jurisdiction over all persons within
its borders and if a foreign sovereign should relinquish jurisdiction over Americans
to a supranational court, the limitations the Constitution imposes upon United States
courts, of indictment, jury trial and impartial judges of life tenure, would not be
applicable, and at the most only those limitations of reasonableness and due process
would be applicable.
"The supranational body could adopt such national legislation, of both substance
[Vol. 7: 155
The final problem concerns the composition of a court to hear these
cases. Regardless of objection by other countries, the United States
would face the same constitutional obstacles presented in Krueger and
Covert in removing its courts-martial system beyond the reaches of
national sovereignty and incorporating it into an international system.
A possible alternative would permit the supranational body to create its
own independent judicial system within the framework of the treaty.86
If such a court system were established, a United States civilian could
be accorded an expeditious trial consonant with his constitutional rights,
and this might, moreover, stimulate a greater degree of solidarity and
understanding among the member nations.
and procedure, as was not specifically excluded, similar to the American Assimilative
Crimes Act of 1948, 6z STAT. 686 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952) which made
applicable to federal enclaves unpreempted criminal statutes of the various states in
which the federal enclave was located. See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286
(1958).
' It is possible that such a system could be composed of nationals of the host country
with advisors serving on the court from each visiting country, and ultimate appeal
lying to a composite body, of all participating nations, with permanent existence and
situs.
1958] NOTES

